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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






LORENZO RUFINO-SILVA,  
Petitioner, 
     
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review from a Final Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 Agency No. A088-231-993 
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
May 26, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 








*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Lorenzo Rufino-Silva, a non-citizen and national of Mexico, petitions for review 
of a final decision issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his second 
motion to reopen or reconsider his application for cancellation of removal.  He contends 
that a defective notice to appear (NTA) deprived the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, 
and therefore, his removal proceedings should be terminated.  Because our precedential 
decision in Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2019), forecloses his jurisdictional 
argument, we will deny the petition. 
I 
After being in the United States for more than twenty years, Rufino-Silva received 
an NTA charging him as removable for having entered the country without authorization.  
The NTA did not state the date or time of his hearing.  Shortly thereafter, he received a 
second notice setting his hearing for May 13, 2010, at 9:00 a.m. 
Rufino-Silva appeared before the Immigration Judge (IJ), conceded removability, 
and applied for cancellation of removal on the ground that his removal would pose an 
exceptional hardship for his minor son who is a U.S. citizen.  The IJ denied his 
application but granted the alternative relief of voluntary departure.  The BIA affirmed 
that decision. 
Rufino-Silva did not leave the country.  Years later, he moved the BIA to reopen 
his removal proceedings to consider new evidence of hardship to his son.  In February 
2019, the BIA denied the motion. 
3 
 
Rufino-Silva petitioned this Court to review the BIA’s February 2019 decision.  
He asserted for the first time that his removal proceedings should be terminated for lack 
of jurisdiction because the NTA he received did not contain the date and time of his 
hearing as required under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).  In July 2019, this 
Court dismissed the petition insofar as it presented an issue that had not been raised 
before the BIA.  Rufino-Silva v. Att’y Gen., 781 F. App’x 54, 56 (3d Cir. 2019).  The 
panel noted that, mere days before, this Court had rejected his jurisdictional argument in 
Nkomo.  Id. at 56 n.2. 
While that prior appeal was pending before this Court, Rufino-Silva filed a second 
motion before the BIA in which he argued that his case should be terminated for lack of 
jurisdiction under Pereira.  The BIA denied the motion in November 2019, holding that 
this jurisdictional argument had already been rejected in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), and that it would not “revisit that decision here.”  A.R. 3. 
Rufino-Silva returns to this Court, seeking review of the BIA’s latest decision.1 
II 
In Nkomo, we held that an NTA that fails to specify the time and date of an initial 
removal hearing does not deprive an immigration court of jurisdiction.  930 F.3d at 131.  
Here, Rufino-Silva received an NTA without the date and time for the initial hearing but 
 
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) and (c).  We have jurisdiction to 
review a timely petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  When a petition presents a purely legal 
question, our review is de novo.  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197-98 (3d Cir. 
2008).   
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later received a second notice specifying that information.  Under Nkomo, the IJ had 
jurisdiction over Rufino-Silva’s removal proceedings. 
Rufino-Silva argues that Pereira compels a different result.  But Nkomo already 
considered and rejected that argument.  The Nkomo court held that Pereira is inapposite, 
because that case addressed the NTA requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) for purposes 
of triggering the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)—statutes that are not 
referenced in the “jurisdiction-vesting” regulations at issue here.  See Nkomo, 930 F.3d at 
133-34; accord Guadalupe v. Att’y Gen., 951 F.3d 161, 163 n.6 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pereira 
does not implicate the IJ’s authority to adjudicate.” (citing Nkomo)).  Therefore, Nkomo 
controls. 
Recognizing as much, Rufino-Silva argues that the BIA exceeded its power in 
Bermudez-Cota and that Nkomo’s reliance on that decision was misplaced.  He also urges 
us to reexamine Nkomo and find that it is no longer good law because it conflicts with 
Pereira as interpreted by other circuits.  These arguments are unavailing.  First, we note 
that Nkomo did not rely on Bermudez-Cota in reaching its holding. See Nkomo, 940 F.3d 
at 132, 133 (indicating only that the BIA below cited to Bermudez-Cota and that the 
BIA’s decision in Bermudez-Cota was in line with seven of our sister circuits).  Second, 
and more fundamentally, these arguments do not present a basis for a panel of this Court 
to revisit a precedential decision of another panel of this Court.  See Jutrowski v. Twp. of 
Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293 n.13 (3d Cir. 2018); cf. Guadalupe, 951 F.3d at 162 
(holding, in the first instance, that Pereira abrogated our earlier decision in Orozco-
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Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2016), because the NTA in both cases 
involved the stop-time rule).2 
III 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition.  
 
2 We note that the supposedly conflicting out-of-circuits cases cited by Rufino-Silva are 
not necessarily contrary to our holding in Nkomo.  Those cases treat the regulations at 
issue as “claim-processing” rules, rather than “jurisdiction-vesting” rules, but they reach 
the same conclusion: the alleged defects in the NTA do not deprive the immigration court 
of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Perez-Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1155, 1156-57 
(11th Cir. 2019).  While the difference in reasoning might matter in a different case, it 
does not matter here.  Even if we were to interpret Nkomo as being consistent with the 
“claim-processing” approach, Rufino-Silva’s petition would still fail.  By not raising the 
alleged defects in the NTA in a timely manner, he forfeited that defense under the “claim-
processing” approach.  See Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 964 (7th Cir. 2019).  He 
has also failed to exhaust that issue.  See Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1157. 
